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The Special Nature of International
Insurance and Reinsurance
Arbitration:
A Response to Professor Jerry
S.I. Strong*

I.

INTRODUCTION

As Professor Jerry has so eloquently demonstrated, dispute resolution plays a
significant role in the insurance industry, even though very few academics have
written about the special nature of this area of law, largely because of a lack of
communication between specialists in insurance law and specialists in dispute
resolution.1 Though understandable from a historical perspective, this sort of
separation of substantive and procedural expertise can create numerous individual
and systemic problems.2 Not only are parties left without a full appreciation of
the scope and nature of the dispute resolution options that are available to them,
but courts and legislatures are forced to make critical determinations about the
content and shape of the law without a proper understanding of how various
mechanisms operate in a particular context.3
One unfortunate side effect of the current situation has been the unspoken assumption that dispute resolution of insurance matters can or should be considered
analogous to procedures used in other areas of law.4 While some similarities of
course exist, insurance disputes involve a number of unique attributes that require
specialized analysis.5 As a result, Professor Jerry is completely correct in calling
for more intensive consideration of how dispute resolution processes operate in

* Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge; D.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D., Duke University;
M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The author, who is
admitted to practice as an attorney in New York, Illinois and Missouri and as a solicitor in England and
Wales, is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of Missouri and Senior Fellow at
the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. The author would like to thank Bob Jerry for comments on earlier drafts of this Response and Paul Stephan for comments relating to the self-execution
analysis. Thanks are also due to former colleagues in the Chicago and London offices of Baker &
McKenzie LLP who introduced the author to the world of international insurance and reinsurance law.
All errors of course remain the author’s own.
1. See Robert H. Jerry, II, Dispute Resolution, Insurance, and Points of Convergence, 2015 J. DISP.
RESOL. 255 (2015).
2. Experience in other fields has shown the type of issues that can arise in cases where substantive
experts do not communicate with procedural experts. See S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes:
Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1157, 1165 (2012) (discussing the lack of
communication between arbitration specialists and trust law specialists in cases involving arbitration of
internal trust disputes).
3. See id. at 1165-66, 1193-95 (discussing problems in the context of trust arbitration).
4. See infra notes 27-28, 35-40 and accompanying text.
5. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 256.
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the insurance industry so as to ensure the development and use of fair and efficient
procedures.6
Professor Jerry has provided an excellent overview of the field and has
demonstrated the need for further work in a variety of areas of insurance law.
This Response seeks to further illustrate a number of Professor Jerry’s points by
going into depth in one specific area of insurance law, namely international insurance and reinsurance arbitration.7 In so doing, this Response hopes to provide
experts in both insurance law and dispute resolution with new insights about this
particular procedure while also inspiring further work in this area. Although the
current analysis is intended to be introductory rather than comprehensive, the
discussion nevertheless seeks to demonstrate the diversity and depth of legal and
policy issues associated with international insurance and reinsurance arbitration.
Perhaps the best way of illustrating the complexity of this area of law is by
describing some of the legal tensions that are characteristic of international insurance arbitration. Three key conflicts exist. The first, which is discussed in Section III, involves the interaction between international law and U.S. constitutional
law. This issue, which is becoming particularly acute, arises as a result of the
debate about the extent to which the McCarran-Ferguson Act reverse preempts
certain legal principles in international disputes.8
The second type of conflict involves the tension between U.S. and foreign
law. This discussion, which appears in Section IV, is placed in the context of
Bermuda Form arbitration, although the points are equally applicable to other
types of international insurance arbitration.
The third and final type of conflict arises at the policy level. This analysis,
which is found in Section V, focuses on the tension between the pro-arbitration
policy exhibited by the United States and other countries in matters involving
international commercial disputes and the principle of state regulation to promote
the public interest in insurance law. Inherent in this discussion is the question of
whether private parties should be able to exercise their personal autonomy to create dispute resolution mechanisms that may subvert or conflict with certain public
values.9
Although the various analyses are meant to be introductory rather than comprehensive, they nevertheless require a relatively sophisticated understanding of
the relevant legal principles. Since most readers do not have expertise in all three
areas of practice (insurance law, arbitration law and international law), it may be
helpful to provide a small amount of background information about both insur6. See id. at 256.
7. Although Professor Jerry is correct that all forms of insurance dispute resolution deserve more
attention, the literature on international insurance arbitration is particularly sparse. For example, a
Westlaw search of all journals and law reviews looking for materials with the words “insur! and arbitration or ‘dispute resolution’” in the title yielded only 56 hits. However, when the word “international” was added to the search parameters, Westlaw identified only 6 items. While there are doubtless a
number of relevant articles that do not feature those particular words in the title, a search for articles
with the word “insur!” in the title yielded 7,592 items while a similar search for articles with the word
“arbitration” yielded 5,814 items. The combination of “international” and “arbitration” resulted in
1,043 items. This phenomenon confirms Professor Jerry’s hypothesis that insurance law and arbitration law are largely distinct fields while also showing how limited the scholarship on international
insurance arbitration is. See id. at 256.
8. See 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012).
9. See Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse Preemption of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 262-63 (2004-2005).
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ance law and international arbitration to facilitate conversations across disciplinary lines. This material is found in Section II below.

II.

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND
ARBITRATION LAW

The specialized nature of most areas of law can make interdisciplinary work
extremely challenging. Errors may be particularly likely to arise in situations
where three different disciplines intersect, as is the case with international insurance arbitration, where each of the individual fields of inquiry (international law,
insurance law and arbitration law) are extremely complicated. Although it is it
impossible to provide a comprehensive analysis of each practice area in this Response,10 it is nevertheless helpful to mention a few basic background points to
put the substantive discussion into context.

A.

Basic Principles of International Insurance and Reinsurance Law

Although most lawyers believe themselves familiar with insurance law as a
result of their first-year tort class and their routine daily experiences,11 international insurance and reinsurance differ from domestic insurance in a number of
ways. The key difference, of course, is geographic, since international insurance
involves “insurance underwritten in one country covering risks in another” as well
as “insurance that covers an insured for risks beyond the borders of the insured’s
home country.”12 However, the term “international insurance” can also be used to
refer to various types of reinsurance, which is an insurance mechanism that is
outside the scope of most lawyers’ expertise. Rather than providing direct, primary coverage for a particular risk, reinsurance involves the process of transferring
or “ceding” the risk of insurance from one entity to another.13 Reinsurance often
10. Further reading is of course available for those seeking more information on any particular point.
For background on insurance law, see ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS S. RICHMOND,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW (5th ed. 2012); STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE
(2015). For background on international commercial arbitration, see NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL.,
REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (5th ed. 2009); GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed. 2014); S.I. STRONG, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES (2012) [hereinafter STRONG, GUIDE], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/strongarbit.pdf/$file/strongarbit.pdf. For background
on international law, see JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th
ed. 2012). The American Law Institute (ALI) is also developing a number of relevant Restatements.
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE; RESTATEMENT OF THE U.S. LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION.
11. Of course, as Professor Jerry notes, insurance law is much more complicated than most people
believe. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 257-260.
12. PETER A. MCLAUCHLAN, Keeping on Top of Trends in the International Insurance Marketplace,
in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEVELOPING
PURCHASE STRATEGIES AND OVERCOMING REGULATORY CHALLENGES (2015), available at 2015 WL
831989, *1, *1.
13. See PLITT ET AL., supra note 10, § 9.2. Vocabulary in this field can be confusing. For example,
“[t]he insurance company that is transferring or ‘ceding’ its risk is known as the reinsured, the
‘cedent,’ the original insurer, or the direct insurer” while “[t]he insurance company to which the risk is
being transferred is known as the reinsurer;” “the person or entity that acquires the original insurance
contract from the original insurer . . . is . . . known as the original insured.” Id. (footnotes omitted). A
reinsurer is itself “free to transfer the reinsured risk to another reinsurer, acquiring its own reinsur-
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occurs across national borders so as to spread the risk of loss in a more economically efficient manner.14
Another practical difference between domestic and international insurance involves the type of coverage. Most people think of insurance in the context of
everyday matters, with automobile insurance, health insurance and life insurance
representing the best-known types of insurance.15 Although international insurance and reinsurance can address these sorts of concerns,16 international insurance
also provides for more specialized and often individualized types of risk17 ranging
from maritime matters18 and excess liability19 to political risk, terrorism and kidnapping.20 International insurance also exists for more esoteric matters such as
“rocket launches . . . as well as global rock tours.”21
ance.” Id. (footnotes omitted). “Such a transaction is known as a ‘retrocessional agreement. The transferring reinsurer is known as the ‘retrocedent’ and the reinsurer assuming the risk is known as a ‘retrocessionaire.’” Id. (footnotes omitted).
14. See Hubertus Labes, Selected Areas and Issues of Arbitration in Germany: Arbitration of Insurance Disputes in Germany, in ARBITRATION IN GERMANY: THE MODEL LAW IN PRACTICE 889, 890
(Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel & Stefan Michael Kröll et al. eds., 2015); Jerry, supra note 1, at 276; see also
Mauricio Gomm Ferreira Dos Santos, Arbitration in the Light of the Opening of the Brazilian Reinsurance Market, V REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE ARBITRAGEM 38, 38-43 (2008).
15. In fact, insurance is a much broader field, as Professor Jerry notes. See Jerry, supra note 1, at
257-260.
16. For example, reinsurance cover involves virtually every type of matter contained in a domestic
insurer’s book of business.
17. See Jerry, supra note 1 at 276; see also Lorelie S. Masters, International Insurance: Purchase
and Claim Strategies, in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS
ON DEVELOPING PURCHASE STRATEGIES AND OVERCOMING REGULATORY CHALLENGES (2015),
available at 2015 WL 831988, *1, *1-2 (discussing various types of insurance needed by businesses
operating across national borders); McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *3 (noting international insurance
can address “property, casualty, life, and health . . . because of the commonality of risk issues throughout the world”).
18. Maritime insurance was the first type of international insurance to develop. See McLauchlan,
supra note 12, at *1.
19. Excess liability insurance
track[s] the primary insurance in coverage, conditions, definitions, and exclusions. The excess
carrier relies on the primary carrier for coverage interpretations. The excess contract will not pick
up coverages that are left out of the primary policy. It is and should be used as a means of layering limits of liability to the level needed by the insured.
Howard Ende et al., Liability Insurance: A Primer for College and University Counsel, 23 J.C. & U.L.
609, 675 (1997); see also Richard C. Mason et al., Recent Developments in Excess Insurance, Surplus
Lines Insurance, and Reinsurance Law, 46 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 331, 367-69 (2011) (discussing international issues, among other things).
20. Political risk insurance is becoming increasingly important to companies operating internationally and includes a variety of types of coverage, including that relating to “1. political violence, 2. terrorism, 3. confiscation, expropriation, and nationalization, 4. contract frustration, 5. currency inconvertibility, 6. kidnap and ransom, and 7. selective discrimination.” Sandra Smith Thayer, Political Risk
Insurance: Coverage for Your International Investment, in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW CLIENT
STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEVELOPING PURCHASE STRATEGIES AND OVERCOMING
REGULATORY CHALLENGES (Aspatore 2015), available at 2015 WL 831986, *1, *1; see also Irene S.
Kaptzis, Note, Looking Beyond the Sunset: International Perspectives on the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002 and the Issue of Its Renewal, 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 827, 828 (2004) (discussing the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which has been extended to the year 2020 pursuant to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 (Pub. L. 114-1, 129 Stat. 3)). Many political
risk policies include arbitration provisions. See Thayer, supra, at *5. Furthermore, a number of these
issues would arise in claims arising under investment treaties, suggesting a potentially significant
overlap between insurance law and international investment arbitration (also known as treaty-based
arbitration or investor-state arbitration and sometimes involving bilateral treaty arbitration (BIT arbitration) or arbitration under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
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Another difference between international and domestic insurance involves the
role that regulation and public policy play.22 Domestic insurance is a highly regulated field, although most laws exist at the state rather than federal level.23 This
phenomenon has resulted in numerous discrepancies in insurance practices across
the United States, including with respect to the availability of arbitration.24 Although the situation is changing, with a number of states now allowing arbitration
of insurance disputes,25 the availability of arbitration is still highly regulated.26
Insurance arbitration has been challenged for many of the same reasons that
have been raised in other types of domestic arbitration such as employment and
consumer arbitration.27 Indeed, many types of insurance arbitration can and perhaps should be classified as a form of consumer arbitration, although that is a
question that would benefit from further analysis.28 However, it is unclear whether any or all of the criticisms that have been aimed at arbitration of domestic insurance disputes also apply to arbitration of international insurance disputes.

and Nationals of Other States (ICSID arbitration)). See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a
Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: The Re-Politicization of International
Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 211, 234 (2010); Franco Ferrari et al., Panel 3: MultiParty Arbitration Issues in International Project Finance Arbitration, 9 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 759, 768772 (2013). While this Response does not address the overlap between insurance and investment
arbitration, the issues are intriguing. See Mark Kantor, Comparing Political Risk Insurance and Investment Treaty Arbitration, in A Revolution in the International Rule of Law: Essays in Honor of Don
Wallace, Jr., 455, 455-56 (Borzu Sabahi et al. eds., 2014).
21. McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *1.
22. See Robert E. Keeton, Statutory Analogy, Purpose, and Policy in Legal Reasoning: Live Lobsters and a Tiger Cub in the Park, 52 MD. L. REV. 1192, 1198 (1993) (“Insurance law reflects two
compelling themes – contract and public policy.”); Leo P. Martinez, A Unified Theory of Insurance
Risk, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 713, 740-41 (2013).
23. See Martinez, supra note 22, at 740-41; Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note
12, at *2.
24. See Mariana Isabel Hernández-Gutiérrez, The Remaining Hostility Towards Arbitration Shielded
by the McCarran-Ferguson Act: How Far Should the Protection to Policyholders Go? 1 U. PUERTO
RICO BUS. L.J. 35, 35-36 (2010); Jerry, supra note 1, at 274.
25. As Professor Jerry notes, arbitration is standard in many disputes involving the ISO Commercial
General Liability policy as well as in matters involving automobile insurance, crop insurance and
various types of commercial insurance, including those relating to directors and officers (D&O), employment liability, cyber liability, and errors and omissions (E&O). See Jerry, supra note 1, at 274275. Arbitration is also common in other types of insurance, including healthcare insurance. See Jean
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just? 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632 (2005). However, many states have prohibited arbitration of insurance disputes pursuant to the doctrine of reverse
preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act. See 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012); see also infra notes
68-72.
26. See Hernández-Gutiérrez, supra note 24, at 35-36.
27. See Randall, supra note 9, at 262-63 (noting various issues ranging from concerns about due
process and matters involving individual costs to worries about the resolution of socially important
disputes outside the public eye).
28. Some commentators already appear to consider insurance arbitration to fall within the realm of
consumer arbitration involving financial services. See Sternlight, supra note 25, at 1632. However,
other authorities, including various legislatures, specifically exclude insurance arbitration from the
definition of consumer arbitration. See Laura Magnotta, I Agreed to What? Protecting Consumers
From Unfair Practices in Binding Consumer Arbitration, 4 Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. 190, 191 (2012)
(discussing a consumer protection provision enacted by Maryland that explicitly excluded matters
involving property insurance, casualty insurance and surety insurance). This particular issue may be
addressed in the forthcoming Restatement on liability insurance, which distinguishes between sophisticated and unsophisticated policyholders. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, LIABILITY INSURANCE §1
and cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 1 dated April 9, 2013).
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Closer examination of the insurance industry demonstrates a number of key
differences between international and domestic insurance that could and perhaps
should affect analyses about the propriety of arbitration in each of those fields.
For example, most international insurance policies are typically negotiated at
arm’s length by two equally sophisticated commercial actors rather than imposed
by a stronger party on a vulnerable individual.29 These types of issues have been
considered significant when distinguishing between different types of arbitration
outside the insurance context.30
International insurance also differs from domestic insurance in terms of the
amount and type of regulation that exists.31 For example, rather than being subject
to detailed regulatory requirements, most forms of international insurance are only
“regulated by states from a security/solvency standpoint.”32 While this phenomenon can be traced to certain practical difficulties associated with controlling transnational activities in the absence of a single political actor with global regulatory
authority,33 the lack of international regulation can also be attributed to the fact
that international insurance involves highly individualized (as opposed to standardized) types of risks that are quite simply not amenable to blanket regulation.34

B.

Basic Principles of International Arbitration Law

Many commentators, including those in the insurance realm, criticize arbitration as providing “second class” or “rough justice,” based on the belief that all
insurance disputes are subject to highly routinized procedures that cannot provide
parties with the proper procedural safeguards to ensure a fair result.35 Although
the veracity of these sorts of claims can and has been disputed (indeed, empirical
studies suggest that many of these types of criticisms are largely incorrect in the
context of both consumer and employment arbitration),36 there is nothing about
international arbitration that can be framed as constituting “rough justice.”37 To
the contrary, international arbitration has been referred to as “‘Rolls Royce’ justice” as a result of the extremely sophisticated procedures that are used to resolve
complex, high-value and highly individualized disputes.38 Unlike consumer and

29. See Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2.
30. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 3-5.
31. See Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2.
32. McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2; see also Masters, supra note 17, at *3 (discussing regulatory
regime). Some types of voluntary self-regulation also exist in the international realm. See McLauchlan,
supra note 12, at *3 (discussing the rise of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors
(IAIS) over the last decade).
33. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of American
Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009); S.I. Strong, Regulatory Litigation in the European
Union: Does the U.S. Class Action Have a New Analogue? 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 899, 913 (2012)
[hereinafter Strong, Regulatory Litigation].
34. See Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2.
35. See generally Randall, supra note 9, at 257-63 (identifying numerous individual and collective
criticisms of insurance arbitration).
36. See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement is Reshaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165, 179, 187 (2003).
37. See Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration Is Not Arbitration, 2008 STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB.
REV. 1, 1-2; see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 4-5.
38. Mitchell F. Dolin & Ethan M. Posner, Understanding the Bermuda Excess Liability Form, 1 J.
INS. COVERAGE 68, 79 (1998) (quoting RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
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employment arbitration, which involve standardized arbitration provisions that are
imposed by businesses on vulnerable individuals, international arbitration traditionally involves two corporate entities that have negotiated their transaction,
including their dispute resolution clause, at arm’s length.39 As a result, one of the
leading commentators in the field has claimed that “the essential difference” between international and other types of arbitration “is so great that their similarities
are largely illusory.”40
In most cases, the key rationale supporting international commercial arbitration is not the savings of time and money, although parties of course hope for such
a result.41 Instead, parties choose international arbitration to avoid lengthy and
expensive disputes about jurisdiction, to ensure a politically neutral decisionmaker with particular expertise in the substance of the dispute, and, perhaps most
importantly, to reap the advantages of various international treaties providing for
the speedy and efficient enforcement of arbitral awards across international borders.42 All of these rationales are as relevant to disputes involving international
insurance and reinsurance claims as they are to other sorts of international commercial matters.
The two most important treaties in this field, at least for U.S. parties, are the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (commonly known as the New York Convention)43 and the InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (commonly
known as the Panama Convention).44 With 156 states parties, the New York Convention is more widely adhered-to than the Panama Convention, which is only
regional in scope.45 However, the Panama Convention takes precedence over the
New York Convention in cases where both instruments apply.46 Because the two
conventions are very similar in their operative terms and are intended to be interpreted in a consistent manner, most commentators simply discuss the New York
Convention, as will be the case here.47
Although the New York Convention is central to the international arbitral regime, the convention actually serves a very limited purpose, namely the identification of the circumstances in which an arbitration agreement or arbitral award will
be enforced internationally.48 As a result, parties seeking to resolve a dispute
ARBITRATION 455 (1994)); see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 4-5 (discussing nature of international arbitration).
39. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 4-5.
40. Paulsson, supra note 37, at 1.
41. See BORN, supra note 10, at 73-93.
42. See id.
43. See United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]; 9 U.S.C. §201 (2012).
44. See Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, 14 I.L.M. 336 (1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]; 9 U.S.C. §301 (2012).
45. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_ status.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2015) [hereinafter New York Convention Status]; see also Panama Convention, supra note 44, pmbl.
46. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Panama Convention, supra note 44; STRONG, GUIDE,
supra note 10, at 6-7.
47. See New York Convention, supra note 43; John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its
Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 19-23 (2000).
48. See New York Convention, supra note 43, arts. II-III, V.
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relating to international arbitration must have recourse to a variety of other authorities.49 The type of authority used will depend on the type of dispute at issue.50
One of the more important types of legal authorities in international arbitration involves national laws on arbitration.51 Although national laws on arbitration
address a broader range of subjects than international treaties do, most arbitration
laws are also somewhat limited in scope and primarily address the role that courts
may play in international arbitration.52
The two most important enactments for parties seeking judicial assistance in
the United States are Chapters 2 and 3 (the “international chapters”) of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).53 Notably, Chapter 1 of the FAA (the “domestic chapter”)
only applies to international arbitration to the extent that chapter is not superseded
by or inconsistent with Chapters 2 and 3.54 Although some U.S. states have enacted their own laws on international arbitration, it is unclear whether and to what
extent these laws are preempted by the FAA.55 Thus, at this point, most of the
U.S. law of international arbitration exists at the federal level.56
International arbitration is also subject to numerous other sources of law.57
Some of these authorities (such as procedural rules promulgated by various arbitral institutions) are chosen by the parties rather than imposed by the state.58 Other materials (such as scholarly commentary and arbitral awards rendered in other
disputes) are considered persuasive rather than mandatory.59 However, most international arbitrators give great weight to these sorts of authorities, since reliance
on such materials allows the development of a consistent and predictable approach
to the resolution of international disputes and provides for a procedural mechanism.60
As this discussion shows, the depth and diversity of persuasive authorities in
international arbitration is much more extensive than non-specialists realize.61
Not only do parties and practitioners have access to a significant and everincreasing number of published arbitral awards (something that does not exist in
49. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 12-24.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 14-15 (discussing the role of national law in international arbitration).
52. See id. at 14 (noting that most arbitration statutes do not discuss the procedures to be used during
the arbitration itself).
53. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-307 (2012); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 24-27. Chapter 2 relates to
the New York Convention while Chapter 3 relates to the Panama Convention. See id.; see also New
York Convention, supra note 43; Panama Convention, supra note 44; 9 U.S.C. §§201, 301 (2012).
54. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 25-27; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.
55. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law on
International Commercial Arbitration (1985) with amendments as adopted in 2006, Status,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (noting that the UNCITRAL Model Arbitration Law has been adopted by California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Oregon and Texas); Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act
Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 395 (2004).
56. See BORN, supra note 10, at 157; S.I. Strong, Border Skirmishes: The Intersection Between
Litigation and International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 nn. 9-10.
57. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 12-24.
58. See S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 12-14 (2009) [hereinafter STRONG, RESEARCH] (distinguishing between
public and private forms of authority); see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 19 (listing wellknown arbitral institutions in international matters).
59. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 21-23.
60. See id. at 23.
61. See generally STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 58, at 83-85, 88-137.
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many types of domestic arbitration, including consumer arbitration),62 they also
have access to a vast body of commentary concerning international arbitration.63
Together, these materials create a system that is much more transparent and predictable than non-specialists appreciate.64
Although some differences may arise between international insurance and reinsurance arbitration and other sorts of international arbitration, insurance disputes
nevertheless fall within the general umbrella of international arbitration.65 As a
result, the entire body of national, international and persuasive law concerning
international commercial arbitration can and should be considered applicable to
matters involving international insurance and reinsurance.

III.
INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE ARBITRATION –
TENSIONS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The highly regulated nature of the U.S. insurance industry can sometimes
suggest that all matters involving insurance can and should be determined exclusively by reference to the law of individual U.S. states.66 However, international
insurance disputes can require recourse to other types of law, most notably international and constitutional law.67 In some cases, a potential conflict arises between the various types of law, as illustrated by the recent debate about reverse
preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.68
The concept of “reverse preemption” is well-known in insurance circles and
involves situations in which Congress defers to state authority, thereby allowing
62. See id. at 83-85. Various types of arbitral awards are published in summary or redacted form.
See New York City Bar, Committee on International Commercial Disputes, Publication of International
Arbitral
Awards
and
Decisions
8,
10
(Feb.
2014),
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072645PublicationofInternationalArbitrationAwardsandDecisions.pdf (noting, for example, that the Society of
Maritime Arbitrators usually publishes all awards in their entirety).
63. See generally STRONG, RESEARCH, supra note 58, at 88-137.
64. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 21-24.
65. For example, insurance matters can be considered “commercial” in nature and therefore falls
within the scope of the New York Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. I(3);
BORN, supra note 10, at 307 (noting most countries, including the United States, have adopted a relatively broad definition of “commercial” in the context of international commercial arbitration); S.I.
Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty and Statutory Interpretation in International Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 536 (2013) [hereinafter
Strong, Treaty] (noting “the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution . . . is broadly construed as a
matter of both constitutional and arbitral law”); see also U.S. Const., art. I, §8, cl. 3; Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-19 (2001); infra note 134 and accompanying text.
66. See Martinez, supra note 22, at 740-41; Masters, supra note 17, at *3; McLauchlan, supra note
12, at *2.
67. See Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (considering constitutional issues in the context
of a conflict of laws issue involving Wisconsin and Minnesota law); Ario v. The Underwriting Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyd’s for the 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 286 (3d Cir. 2010) (considering the interaction between the FAA and the Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act in a case
involving the New York Convention); Thomas O. Main, On Teaching Conflicts and Why I Dislike
Allstate Insurance v. Hague, 12 NEV. L.J. 600, 600 (2012) (noting that Allstate Ins. v. Hague required
the U.S. Supreme Court to consider “the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses”).
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012). Other types of preemption questions may arise in the future as
more states attempt to enact legislation dealing with international commercial arbitration. See Drahozal, supra note 55, at 395; see also Ario, 618 F.3d at 286 (discussing preemption in context of FAA and
Pennsylvania Uniform Arbitration Act).
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state law to trump (i.e., reverse preempt) federal law.69 According to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, “[n]o Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair,
or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”70 Thus, “McCarran-Ferguson authorizes ‘reverse preemption’ of generally
applicable federal statutes by state laws enacted for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance.”71
The McCarran-Ferguson Act has been held to authorize reverse preemption
of the FAA in cases where state law bars arbitration of domestic insurance disputes falling entirely under Chapter 1 of the FAA.72 While this conclusion is incontrovertible in the domestic realm, problems arise in international disputes due
to questions involving the nature of the New York Convention and the relationship between the convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA.73
According to the terms of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, reverse preemption
only applies to “acts of Congress.”74 As a result, McCarran-Ferguson would not
seem to apply to issues governed by international treaties, since a treaty is not
technically an “Act of Congress.”75 However, certain problems arise as a result of
the way that international treaties are given domestic effect in U.S. courts.76 According to a well-established line of cases, some treaties signed by the United
States are “self-executing” in nature, which means that they can be relied upon in
U.S. courts without the need for any help from Congress.77 However, other trea69. See Anita Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 669, 673 n.29 (2009). A
type of reverse preemption could arise under the New York Convention, to the extent Congress declares a certain issue non-arbitrable and thus incapable of resolution under the convention. See New
York Convention, supra note 43, art. II(1); Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898,
907 (5th Cir. 2005); Stawski Distributing Co. v. Browary Zywiec S.A., 349 F.3d 1023, 1025-26 (7th
Cir. 2003); Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When it is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1252 (2005); David A. Rich, Deference to the “Law of Nations”: The Intersection Between the New York Convention, the Convention Act, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and State
Anti-Insurance Arbitration Statutes, 33 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 81, 84 (2010). However, this phenomenon has been traditionally discussed in the arbitration world as involving the principle of nonarbitrability rather than preemption. See BORN, supra note 10, at 964-69.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012).
71. ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 380 (4th Cir. 2012).
72. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012).
73. See New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Bernstein, supra note 69, at 673
n.29; Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 514-21.
74. See 15 U.S.C § 1012(b) (2012).
75. See id.; ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 390. Because the McCarran-Ferguson Act was enacted in
1945, it pre-dates Chapter 2 of the FAA and therefore cannot benefit from interpretive canons such as
the last-in-time rule. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I., 466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Strong, Treaty, supra note 65,
at 515 n.85.
76. See Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 511-14.
77. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314-15 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic
Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 320 (1992); Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at
511-14; Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 578 (2007). The term “self-executing” has
several meanings. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 n.2 (2008); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (7th ed. 2008). The issue involves the question of monism and
dualism as principles of international law, although the U.S. concept of self-execution incorporates
certain constitutional law issues into the analysis. See David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The
Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 135, 137-39 (2012)
[hereinafter Sloss, Two-Step]; Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 511-14.
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ties are “non-self-executing” and can only be given effect in U.S. courts to the
extent the Congress has enacted what is known as “implementing” or “enabling
legislation.”78
Authorities agree that the judicial test for self-execution is extremely convoluted.79 The analysis is made even more confusing by virtue of the fact that a
treaty may be self-executing as to some issues or for some purposes but not as to
others.80 Interestingly, some of the more nuanced questions about self-execution
have arisen in cases involving international insurance arbitration.81
The debate about self-execution in the insurance context is based on language
in the FAA indicating that the New York Convention “shall be enforced in United
States courts in accordance with this chapter” (i.e., Chapter 2).82 On its face, this
phrase seems to suggest that the New York Convention is non-self-executing,
which could mean that the convention is reverse preempted by the McCarranFerguson Act.83 However, the language could also be read as simply referring to
the various procedural features reflected in Chapter 2 of the FAA (for example,
those relating to federal jurisdiction, venue, etc.) and indicating that those procedural mechanisms were meant to be used in cases arising under the New York
Convention.84 In many ways, this latter interpretation appears more correct as a
matter of arbitration law, given that many countries that do not require enabling
legislation to give domestic effect to international treaties have nevertheless
adopted national legislation that is the functional equivalent of Chapter 2 of the
FAA.85

78. See Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 510-11, 546.
79. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-32 (2008); ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 388 (noting the
question of self-execution is “murky”); Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370,
373 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing the test for self-execution as involving “several factors in discerning
the intent of the parties to the agreement: (1) the language and purposes of the agreement as a whole;
(2) the circumstances surrounding its execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the
agreement; (4) the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5) the implications of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute”); Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L.
540, 540 (2008); Sloss, Two-Step, supra note 77, at 135; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines
of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695 (1995); Wu, supra note 77, at 578-79.
80. See Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L.
455, 469 (2010); see also ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 387; Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 732 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment)
(suggesting that only Article II of the New York Convention should be considered self-executing),
cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010). This bifurcated approach has been considered inappropriate as a
matter of statutory construction. See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 108
(2013) (discussing Chapter 1 of the FAA).
81. See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 387; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732 (Clement, C.J., concurring in
the judgment) (suggesting that only Article II of the New York Convention should be considered selfexecuting).
82. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); see also New York Convention, supra note 43. The analysis would be
the same under the Panama Convention. See Panama Convention, supra note 44; 9 U.S.C. § 301
(2012).
83. See New York Convention, supra note 43; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012).
84. See New York Convention, supra note 43; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; STRONG, GUIDE, supra
note 10, at 15 (discussing the role of the FAA in international arbitration matters).
85. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 518.
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At this point, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed this issue directly.86
However, the Court has occasionally suggested (ober dicta and in other contexts)
that the New York Convention may be self-executing,87 although those statements
were quite brief and have not been relied upon by lower courts.88
More detailed analysis exists at the intermediate appellate level, although a
rather significant circuit split has developed in recent years.89 Most district courts
that have considered the question of self-execution have concluded that reverse
preemption does not occur in cases falling under the New York Convention.90
Although this Response does not seek to resolve this particular question, it is nevertheless useful to outline the circuit court analyses so as to demonstrate the type
86. Certiorari was sought on this issue in 2010 but was not granted. See La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010) (regarding
an insurance dispute).
87. See New York Convention, supra note 43. The Court noted in Medellin v. Texas (a nonarbitration case) that Congress is up to the task of implementing non-self-executing treaties, even those
involving complex commercial disputes. . . . The judgments of a number of international tribunals
enjoy a different status because of implementing legislation enacted by Congress. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C.
§§201-08 (“The [U.N.] Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards
of June 10, 1958, shall be enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter,” §201).
Such language demonstrates that Congress knows how to accord domestic effect to international obligations when it desires such a result.
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009); see also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
520 n.15 (1974) (noting that “Congress passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act [FAA] in
order to implement the Convention,” although the Court did not decide whether the convention was
self-executing).
88. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 722 (5th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010). But see id. at 733-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in
the judgment). Lower federal courts have typically found a way to avoid the issue of self-execution.
See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 388 (4th Cir. 2012); Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc. 426 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1301 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (citing both the convention and the FAA), aff’d,
488 F.3d 891 (11th Cir. 2007); Chloe Z Fishing Co. v. Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d
1236, 1252-53 (S.D. Cal. 2000); In re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. 26, 30-31 (D.C.N.Y. 1974).
89. Although the Third Circuit has addressed this issue in passing, that analysis focused largely on
issues relating to foreign sovereign immunity and is therefore not really relevant to this discussion. See
Suter v. Munich Reins. Co., 223 F.3d 150, 162 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting lack of reverse preemption);
Zachary M. VanVactor, Comment, Three’s a Crowd: The Unhappy Interplay Among the New York
Convention, the FAA, and McCarran-Ferguson Act, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 313, 327-29 (2011). The Second Circuit has also considered the interplay between the McCarran-Ferguson Act, the New York
Convention, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the FAA, again primarily in passing.
See Stephens v. National Distillers & Chemical Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1231-34 (2d Cir. 1995); see also
New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); 28 U.S.C. §
1602 (2012).
90. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Todd v. Steamship Mut. Underwriting Assoc., Inc.,
No. 08-1195, 2011 WL 1226464, at *10 (E.D. La. Mar. 28, 2011); Viator v. Dauterive Contractors,
Inc., 638 F. Supp. 2d 641, 652 n.18 (E.D. La. 2009); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. SR Int’l Bus. Inc. Co.,
No. 07-CV-1071, 2007 WL 2752366, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 20, 2007) (declining to follow the Second
Circuit rule and noting “[t]he court finds more persuasive the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits’ statement
that the New York Convention ‘must be enforced according to its terms over all prior inconsistent rules
of law.’ This view is more in line with the New York Convention’s intended purpose and the Eighth
Circuit’s strong language recognizing that ‘international comity is a fundamental principle deserving of
substantial deference’”) (citations omitted); Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I.,
466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1297 (N.D. Ga. 2006); Transit Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of
London, No. 96-4173-CV-C-2, 1996 WL 938126, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 10, 1996), appeal dismissed
by 119 F.3d 619 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Arbitration Between Engl. Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992),
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1993).
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of complexity that can arise in disputes involving international insurance and reinsurance arbitration.91
The first decision in this line of cases was issued by the Second Circuit in
1995 in Stephens v. American International Insurance Co.92 The opinion, which
is extremely brief and conclusory, has won few adherents and was almost immediately called into question by another panel sitting in the same circuit.93 In this
opinion, the Second Circuit characterized Chapter 2 of the FAA as a type of implementing legislation, which led to the determination that the New York Convention was not self-executing.94
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit appears to have overlooked a
number of salient issues, the most notable of which is the fact that the United
States’ treaty obligations continue regardless of the status of the treaty within the
domestic legal order.95 The court also relied heavily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s
definition of a self-executing treaty in Foster v. Nielson, which was decided in
1829.96 Although Foster remains good law, the Supreme Court has supplemented
its understanding of self-execution in the years since Stephens was handed
down,97 thereby diminishing any persuasive power Stephens might have.98
91. Interestingly, this is the one area of international insurance arbitration that has attracted the
attention of commentators. See Cindy Galway Buys & Grant Gorman, Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung and the Scope of the President’s Foreign Affairs Power to Preempt Words, 32 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 205, 219 (2012); Ronald G. Goss, Can State Laws Prevent International Arbitration of Insurance
Disputes Under the
New York Convention? 65 DISP. RESOL. J. 14, 93 (Nov. 2010–Jan. 2011); Joshua J. Newcomer, International Decision, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 326, 326-32 (2011); Rich, supra note 69, at 84-86; Michael J.
Ritter, Disputing Arbitration Clauses in International Insurance Agreements: Problems With the SelfExecution Framework, 3 PACE INT’L L. REV. 40, 41 (2012); Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 14-21;
Aaron L. Wells, When “Yes” Means “No”: McCarran-Ferguson, the New York Convention, and the
Limits of Congressional Assent, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L. J. 267, 297-98 (2012).
92. See Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995); see also New York Convention,
supra note 43.
93. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Stephens, 66 F.3d at 41; see also ESAB Group, 685
F.3d at 385, 390-91 (claiming Stephens, 69 F.3d at 1226, called Stephens, 66 F.3d at 41, into question).
94. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45; see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253,
313-14 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89
(1833).
95. See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587 F.3d 714, 726 n.53
(5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010); BROWNLIE, supra note 77, at 34-35; LOUIS
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 200 (2d ed. 1996); Jackson,
supra note 77, at 313, 316-17; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art.
26, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (describing the duty of performance in good faith (pacta sunt
servanda)).
96. Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45. Foster stated that
[o]ur constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without
the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract –
when either of the parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become a rule for the court.
Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
97. See Stephens, 66 F.3d at 45; Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 313-14; see also Medellin v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009); Garcia v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 2866, 2868-71 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Noriega v. Pastrana, 559 U.S. 917, 917 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari);
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 436-37 (2006); Medellin v. Drake, 544 U.S. 660, 685-90
(2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 735 (2004); Torres v.
Mullin, 540 U.S. 1035, 1035 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
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In 2009, the Fifth Circuit considered similar issues in Safety National Casualty Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London.99 The discussion was extremely robust and considered both the mandatory nature of the New York Convention as well as the purpose of Chapter 2 of the FAA in giving effect to the
convention.100
In its analysis, the Fifth Circuit was guided in part by the pro-arbitration policy enunciated in both the New York Convention and longstanding Supreme Court
precedent.101 The Fifth Circuit was also influenced by the fact that Chapter 2 of
the FAA serves a variety of purposes within the international arbitral regime, including the creation of federal jurisdiction and the identification of an appropriate
venue.102 This aspect of the Fifth Circuit’s analysis is important because it suggests that Chapter 2 of the FAA does not necessarily constitute a form of implementing legislation, at least in the traditional sense.103
The Fifth Circuit also expanded on the concept of a self-executing treaty, particularly in the context of reverse preemption, stating that
[e]ven if the [New York] Convention required legislation to implement
some or all of its provisions in United States courts, that does not mean
that Congress intended an “Act of Congress,” as that phrase is used in the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, to encompass a non-self-executing treaty that
has been implemented by congressional legislation. Implementing legislation that does not conflict with or override a treaty does not replace or
displace that treaty. A treaty remains an international agreement or contract negotiated by the Executive Branch and ratified by the Senate, not
by Congress. The fact that a treaty is implemented by Congress does not
mean that it ceases to be a treaty and becomes an “Act of Congress.”104

98. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722; id. at 737 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
99. See id. at 714. In 2010, the Fifth Circuit was presented with additional questions relating to the
relationship between the New York Convention, the FAA, and the McCarran-Ferguson Act but declined to address those matters and instead sent the issue to the district court on remand. See Todd v.
Steamship Mut. Underwriting Assoc., Inc., 601 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2010), remanded, No. 08-1195,
2011 WL 1226464, at *1139 (E.D. La. Mar. 28 2011).
100. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. II(1); 9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012); Safety Nat’l, 587
F.3d at 719, 722, 725.
101. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 730; see also New York Convention, supra note 43; Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638-39 (1985). A similar approach has
been adopted at the district court level. See Goshawk Dedicated Ltd. v. Portsmouth Settlement Co. I.,
466 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1303 n.8 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (concluding “that the Convention, and the strong
international policy it expresses in favor of enforcing commercial arbitration agreements, supersedes
the McCarran-Ferguson Act”); In re Arbitration Between England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n (Luxembourg) & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91-3645, 1992 WL 37700, at *4-5 (E.D. La. Feb. 18, 1992),
appeal dismissed, 981 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1993).
102. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 203-04 (2012); see Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722. The Fourth Circuit has
taken what seems to be a similar view of Chapter 2, indicating that legislation was necessary as a
means of addressing potential conflicts between Chapter 1 of the FAA and the New York Convention
and “to aid in the enforcement of the Convention.” ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d
376, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2012) (discussing the various purposes of Chapter 2 of the FAA); see also New
York Convention, supra note 43.
103. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 719, 722.
104. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 722-23 (footnotes omitted). Similar conclusions have been reached in
other contexts. See Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 902-03 (5th Cir. 2005)
(noting that “[i]t goes without saying that, upon the United States signing a treaty and Congress adopt-
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This language has led some authorities to characterize Safety National as indicating “that the provisions of a non-self-executing, implemented treaty ‘have
full preemptive effect’” in the United States.105
In arriving at this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the fact that
Chapter 2 of the FAA invokes rights arising out of the convention, which can be
seen as directing the court to the convention itself.106 Furthermore,
[w]hen Congress amended the FAA in 1970 to include provisions that
dealt with the Convention, it provided in 9 U.S.C. §203, that “[a]n action
or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise under the laws and treaties of the United States.” This is a direct indication
that Congress thought that for jurisdictional purposes, an action falling
under the Convention arose not only under the laws of the United States
but also under treaties of the United States.107
These factors led a majority of the Fifth Circuit to conclude that U.S. courts are
empowered under Chapter 2 of the FAA to rely directly on the language of the
New York Convention.108
Although the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the self-executing nature of the New
York Convention is quite detailed, the court did not ultimately decide the case on
those grounds.109 Instead, Safety National turned on the court’s conclusion that
the “commonly understood meaning of an ‘Act of Congress’ does not include a
‘treaty,’ even if the treaty required implementing legislation.”110 Under this interpretive approach, the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not apply in cases where the
language of the convention itself is being construed.111

ing enabling legislation, the treaty becomes the supreme law of the land” (citing Sedco, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican Nat. Oil Co., 767 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also Prokopeva v.
Carnival Corp., No. C-08-213, 2008 WL 4276975, at *3 n.8 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008); Matter of
Arbitration Between England Ship Owners Mut. Ins. Ass’n & Am. Marine Corp., No. 91 – 3645, 1992
WL 37700 at *4. Some courts go even further. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Inc., 969
F.3d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting “ratification of the Convention makes it part of the supreme law
of the land, as enforceable as Congressional enactments”); Clow v. Ins. Corp. of British Columbia, No.
07-403-ST, 2007 WL 2292689, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 6, 2007); Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. R&S Co., 176 F.
Supp. 2d 935, 938 (D. Minn. 2001); Filanto, S.p.A., v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1236
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), appeal dismissed by 984 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.1993) (though also noting a role for the
FAA).
105. See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 386 (quoting Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 733 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment)).
106. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724-25, 727-28; see also New York Convention, supra note 43; 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2012).
107. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430-32 (1920).
108. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 724-25, 727-28; see also id. at 734 (Clement,
C.J., concurring in the judgment) (noting the language of Article II(3) of the New York Convention is
addressed directly at the courts themselves). Interestingly, this approach appears very similar to the
borrowed treaty rule. See infra notes 133-82 and accompanying text.
109. See New York Convention, supra note 43; ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 385.
110. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 723 (concluding “[i]t would seem that “treaty” would include all implemented treaties, regardless of whether they were self-executing or had required implementing
legislation”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 385.
111. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 723; ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 385.
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In addition to the majority holding, Safety National generated both concurring
and dissenting opinions.112 The concurring opinion by Circuit Judge Clement
suggested that the New York Convention should be considered self-executing, at
least with respect to Article II, which is the section of the convention that discusses the mandatory duty to compel arbitration in cases falling under the convention.113 In arriving at this conclusion, Judge Clement focused on the way in which
Article II(3) of the convention speaks directly to the courts of a state party, rather
than to the state party itself.114
Because Judge Clement explicitly considered the issue of self-execution in
her concurrence, she was forced to consider dicta from the U.S. Supreme Court
suggesting that the New York Convention is non-self-executing.115 Judge Clement overcame that obstacle by concluding that the Supreme Court was referring to
Article III, rather than Article II, of the convention.116 While this approach may
make some sense given the language of the convention, commentators have noted
the incongruity of giving different effects to different parts of a single legal instrument.117
Safety National also included a dissenting opinion that took the view that the
New York Convention was a non-self-executing treaty and therefore had no place
in the national legal order.118 In reaching this conclusion, the dissent suggested
that only the implementing legislation (i.e., Chapter 2 of the FAA) had preemptive
effect.119 Because Chapter 2 constitutes an “Act of Congress,” the dissent concluded that Chapter 2 could be reverse preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson
Act.120 However, this approach failed to convince the rest of the judges on the
panel.

112. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 732 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 737 (Elrod,
J., dissenting).
113. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. II; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 733-34 (Clement,
C.J., concurring the judgment); see also ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 387.
114. See Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
115. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521-22 (2009);
Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
116. See New York Convention, supra note 43, arts. II-III; Medellin, 552 U.S. at 521-22; Safety
Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 736-37 (Clement, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also ESAB Group, 685 F.3d
at 387. Article III of the New York Convention states:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall not be imposed substantially more onerous
conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to
which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic
arbitral awards.
New York Convention, supra note 43, art. III. Article II(3), on the other hand, indicates that “[t]he
court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which have made an
agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties
to arbitration . . . .” Id. art. II(3).
117. See RUTLEDGE, supra note 80, at 108 (discussing Chapter 1 of the FAA).
118. See New York Convention, supra note 43; Safety Nat’l., 587 F.3d at 748 (Elrod, C.J., dissenting).
119. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 748 (Elrod, C.J., dissenting); see also New York Convention, supra
note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012).
120. Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 752 (Elrod, C.J., dissenting); see also New York Convention, supra
note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2015/iss2/4

16

Strong: The Special Nature of International Insurance and Reinsurance Arb

No. 2]

A Response to Professor Jerry

299

The final federal appellate court decision in this area of law was handed down
in 2012.121 In ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. PLC, the Fourth Circuit joined the
Fifth Circuit in concluding that the FAA and New York Convention are not reverse preempted by the McCarran-Ferguson Act.122 The two circuit court analyses are in many ways similar, with the Fourth Circuit also deciding the dispute as
a matter of statutory rather than constitutional law.123
In ESAB Group, the Fourth Circuit took the view that “Supreme Court precedent dictates that McCarran-Ferguson is limited to legislation within the domestic
realm,” which eliminates any need to even consider the question of reverse
preemption.124 This conclusion was based on cases indicating that “courts should
be most cautious before interpreting . . . domestic legislation in such a manner as
to violate international agreements.”125 The Fourth Circuit was further persuaded
that a broad reading of McCarran-Ferguson was inappropriate in light of the broad
U.S. policy in favor of international arbitration.126 Indeed, the court held that,
with the adoption of the New York Convention and Chapter 2 of the FAA, “the
government has opted . . . to articulate a uniform policy in favor of enforcing
agreements to arbitrate internationally, even when ‘a contrary result would be
forthcoming in a domestic context.’”127 As a result, the Fourth Circuit held that
“Congress did not intend for the McCarran-Ferguson Act to permit state law to
vitiate international agreements entered by the United States.”128
As this brief discussion has shown, the law regarding the relationship between the New York Convention, the FAA and the McCarran-Ferguson Act is
largely unsettled.129 Overall, the Fifth and Fourth Circuit opinions appear to be
more consistent with well-established principles of international and arbitration
law than the Second Circuit opinion, which suggests that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act will not apply to matters involving international insurance and reinsurance
arbitration.130 However, there are some additional arguments in favor of reverse
preemption that may nevertheless arise in the coming years.131
121. See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 390-91.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 388, 390-91; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). For example, the Fourth Circuit – like the
Fifth Circuit before it – did not decide the issue of whether the New York Convention is self-executing
in whole or in part. See ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 385, 387-88; see also Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 72223. Instead, the Fourth Circuit characterized the question of self-execution of the New York Convention as “murky” and gave no real clues as to how it would decide these issues. ESAB Group, 685 F.3d
at 388; see also New York Convention, supra note 43.
124. ESAB Group, 685 F.3d at 388.
125. Id. (quoting Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 539 (1995)).
126. See id. at 390 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
639 (1985)).
127. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 629).
128. Id. at 388-9 (relying on Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 428 (2003)).
129. See New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); ESAB
Group, 685 F.3d at 388-90; Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 587
F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen-Self Insurers Fund v.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 562 U.S. 827 (2010); Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins. Co., 66 F.3d
41 (2d Cir. 1995).
130. See New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307; 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); ESAB
Group, 685 F.3d at 388-90; Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 714; Stephens, 66 F.3d at 41.
131. There are also additional arguments in favor of the non-applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). For example, some insurance law experts have suggested other possible
arguments, including those alleging that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not affect Congressional
powers under anything other than the Commerce Clause. See id.; Raymond A. Guenter, Rediscovering
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One such argument might claim that insurance disputes do not fall within the
scope of the New York Convention, based on the longstanding practice of distinguishing insurance disputes from other types of commercial matters132 and the fact
that the United States entered a declaration under the New York Convention limiting the treaty to “commercial” matters.133 Although this argument may appear
persuasive on some levels, it is unlikely to prevail given the extremely broad way
that the term “commercial” has been defined as a matter of both arbitration and
constitutional law.134 Furthermore, the mere fact that an arbitration agreement or
award does not fall within the scope of the New York Convention does not make
the agreement or award unenforceable.135 Instead, the parties simply rely on
longstanding common law methods of enforcing the agreement or award.136
This latter mechanism also leads to some potential problems as a result of recent commentary suggesting that foreign arbitral awards not falling under the New
York Convention should be considered pursuant to Chapter 1 of the FAA (a move
that would result in reverse preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act).137
However, older and more established authorities take the view that “[f]oreign
arbitral awards not falling under the Convention are generally enforceable in the
United States in the same manner as foreign judgments . . . .”138 Since enforcement of foreign judgments is largely governed by state law, the question of reverse preemption under the McCarran-Ferguson Act would not arise.139
the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Commerce Clause Limitation, 6 CONN. INS. L.J. 263, 312 (1999-2000)
(suggesting the “preemption provision of Section 2(b) should be applied only to federal commerce
clause laws”). This argument would exempt matters involving arbitration pursuant to a treaty, since the
treaty-making power is not part of the Commerce Clause. Compare U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 with
id. art. I, § 10.
132. The doctrine has a somewhat convoluted history in the United States. See Paul v. Virginia, 75
U.S. 168 (1868), overruled in part by United States v. S.-E. Underwriters’ Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553
(1944), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-12; Jeffrey E. Thomas, Insurance Law Between
Business Law and Consumer Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 353, 353 (2010). Other countries appear to
retain this distinction, at least in some regards. See Regulation (EU) 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), para. 18, 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1 (distinguishing
insurance law); Helmut Heiss, Towards a European Insurance Contract Law: Restatement – Common
Frame of Reference – Optional Instrument?, 7-8 (distinguishing insurance contracts from other types
of
contracts),
http://www.aidahungary.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/AIDA2006_11_24_Helmut_Heiss_eloadas.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
133. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. I(3); New York Convention Status, supra note
45.
134. See Strong, Treaty, supra note 65, at 536 (noting “the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
. . . is broadly construed as a matter of both constitutional and arbitral law”); see also U.S. Const., art.
I, §8, cl. 3; Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115-19 (2001). As a result, disputes
involving international insurance and reinsurance would likely fall within the scope of the New York
Convention. See New York Convention, supra note 43.
135. See New York Convention, supra note 43.
136. See Weizmann Inst. of Sci. v. Neschis, 421 F. Supp. 2d 654, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (involving an
award made in a country that had not joined the New York Convention).
137. See BORN, supra note 10, at 156 (referring to the draft Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration); see also New York Convention, supra note 43; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-208
(2012); 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
138. Weizmann Inst., 421 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (citing authorities); BORN, supra note 10, at 156;
STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 30.
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); BORN, supra note 10, at 163; S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 56 (2014); see
also supra note 55 and accompanying text (regarding state law on international commercial arbitration).
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Another possible argument focuses on Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, which allows courts to refuse enforcement of foreign arbitral awards on
the grounds of public policy.140 Given the importance of public policy in insurance law, some parties might claim that the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows individual U.S. states to implement their own individual public policies regarding
insurance law, which should include matters with international connections.141
However, this argument is extremely problematic given language from the U.S.
Supreme Court indicating that the United States needs to speak with “one voice”
regarding matters involving foreign relations142 and longstanding precedent holding that the public policy exception under the New York Convention is very narrowly drawn and largely dependent on questions of international public policy.143
As this brief introduction has shown, questions relating to international insurance and reinsurance arbitration can be quite complicated. Furthermore, given the
importance of the international insurance market to U.S. commercial interests,144 it
appears likely that the Supreme Court will need to address the growing circuit
split at some point in the relatively near future.145 The Court’s efforts in this regard would be significantly aided if there were more high-quality commentary in
this field, as Professor Jerry has suggested.146

IV.

INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE ARBITRATION –
TENSIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND FOREIGN LAW

As intriguing as conflicts between international and U.S. constitutional law
may be, such issues arise relatively infrequently.147 The more common concern in
international insurance and reinsurance arbitration involves the tension between
U.S. and foreign law.148
Conflict of laws questions arise with some frequency in insurance disputes,
although most cases focus on the applicability of the laws of different U.S. states

140. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. V(2)(b).
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
142. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 242 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that “[i]n
our dealings with the outside world the United States speaks with one voice and acts as one, unembarrassed by the complications as to domestic issues which are inherent in the distribution of political
power between the national government and the individual states”); see also ESAB Group, Inc. v.
Zurich Ins. PLC, 685 F.3d 376, 379 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Pink in the international insurance context).
143. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 84; see also infra notes 209-11 and accompanying text
(discussing the need to rely on international, not domestic, public policy).
144. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, THE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 3 (2015) (suggesting
that 62% of U.S. insurance premiums were ceded to offshore companies, although that number rises to
92% if the fact that many U.S. reinsurers are owned by foreign companies is taken into account).
145. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 279 (regarding the size of the international insurance market); see also
supra note 89-143 and accompanying text.
146. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 279-280.
147. Arbitration can only generate conflicts between international and constitutional law in cases
where a party seeks to enforce an international arbitration agreement or award in the United States, and
most parties comply voluntarily with such agreements and awards. See New York Convention, supra
note 43, arts. II-III; BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 11.02; see also Masters, supra note 17, at *14
(noting that most parties to international insurance disputes used to simply settle their cases).
148. See Masters, supra note 17, at *5 (noting the need to compare “the different regulatory or national environments” in which an insured operates to understand scope of coverage and related issues).
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rather than the laws of different countries.149 Some distinction can also be made
with respect to the type of legal tension that arises in international and domestic
matters. For example, in interstate disputes, the conflict is between two different
sources of substantive law (since the procedural law is always supplied by the
forum),150 while in international disputes the tension is between substantive and
procedural law.
The best way to illustrate these types of concerns is by putting the discussion
into context. One excellent example involves arbitration under the Bermuda
Form, which is a popular type of excess insurance policy featuring an innovative
dispute resolution mechanism that has been widely copied.151
The Bermuda Form was developed in the mid-1980s as a result of the worldwide “‘tort-insurance’ crisis” which saw the number and type of tort claims expanding at such a rate and to such an extent that liability insurance was only
“available, if at all, at high premiums and with numerous exclusions.”152 The
crisis generated a number of different national responses, although
the response of the United States was of an entirely different order. A series of cases in the 1980s established that liability policies which covered
personal injury property damage occurring during their currency were required to respond on a “continuous” or “triple trigger” basis. The most
important of those cases, involving liability for injuries resulting from
exposure to asbestos, was Keene Corp v Insurance Co of North America
667 F. 2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), which held that a liability policy in
force on any of exposure, injury or manifestation of injury was required
to respond, and that each insurer faced joint and several liability. (These
rulings are still impacting on the English reinsurance market . . . .) It became all but impossible for US manufacturing companies to obtain insurance at affordable rates. This led to an initiative spearheaded by leading
brokers, banks and insurers to establish and capitalise two new insurers,
Ace and XL, to act as high-level excess-layer insurers. The new companies were located in Bermuda, and policy wordings were developed to
ensure that appropriate coverage was provided. Those wordings, . . .
have changed over time but . . . have become known as the Bermuda
Form.153

149. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (considering a conflict between Wisconsin
and Minnesota law); Main, supra note 67, at 600 (suggesting that the case required the U.S. Supreme
Court to consider “the principal constitutional underpinnings of conflicts doctrine, namely the Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses”).
150. See S.I. Strong, Limits of Procedural Choice of Law, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1027, 1030 (2014).
151. See Masters, supra note 17, at *14; McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *2 (noting that “excess and
surplus lines of insurance” cover specialized risks and are generally individually negotiated); see also
supra note 19 and accompanying text (defining excess liability insurance).
152. Rob Merkin, Book Review, Liability Insurance in International Arbitration: The Bermuda
Form, 2 J. BUS. L. 161, 161 (2012).
153. Id. (citations omitted). The English insurance and reinsurance market is expected to change
radically, including with respect to dispute resolution matters, as a result of the English Insurance Act
2015, which comes into effect in August 2016. See Holman Fenwick Willan, DISP. RESOL. BULL., 2-3
(July 2015), available at http://www.hfw.com/downloads/HFW-Dispute-Resolution-Bulletin-July2015.pdf.
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As this passage suggests, the Bermuda Form focuses on liability for largescale, catastrophic loss such as that arising out of mass tort scenarios.154 The
Bermuda Form was in many ways revolutionary155 and attempts to provide a relatively balanced approach to the interests of policyholders and investors while also
avoiding various substantive problems associated with traditional modes of insurance coverage.156
Although the Bermuda Form has been adapted a number of times over the
years, certain core attributes have remained constant.157 For example, the Bermuda Form operates as a single contract rather than a series of annual contracts, with
an “occurrence” under the Form arising upon the first claim from a policyholder.158
As interesting as these and other substantive features are, the most intriguing
point for the purposes of the current discussion involves the way in which the
Bermuda Form splits jurisdictional competency over matters of procedural and
substantive law.159 In particular, the Bermuda Form requires the substantive dispute to be decided pursuant to a modified version of New York law, but requires
the matter to be heard by arbitration seated in London and governed by the English Arbitration Act 1996.160 Thus, the arbitration provision found in most the
recent iteration of the Bermuda Form (Form XL XS-004) indicates that
[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Policy or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof shall be finally and fully determined in London, England under the provisions of the Arbitration
Acts of 1950, 1975 and 1979 and/or any statutory modifications or
amendments thereto, for the time being in force, by a Board composed of
three arbitrators to be selected for each controversy as follows . . . .161
Form XL XS-004 also states that
This Policy, and any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Policy, shall be governed by and construed in accordance with
the internal laws of the State of New York, except insofar as such laws:

154. See RICHARD JACOBS ET AL., LIABILITY INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE
BERMUDA FORM 1 (2004); see also DAVID SCOREY ET AL., THE BERMUDA FORM: INTERPRETATION
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION OF EXCESS LIABILITY INSURANCE (2011); Thomas Brusstar et al., Key
Issues in Bermuda Form Arbitrations, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION
INSURANCE
COVERAGE
LITIGATION
COMMITTEE
(Mar.
5,
2011),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/docs/2011-cle-materials/17KeyIssuesBermudaArbitration/17a_Key_Issues_In_Bermuda-Form_Arbitrations.pdf.
155. See John Fellas, International Arbitration Under the Bermuda Form, 8 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 129,
132 (2014).
156. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 12-14.
157. See Merkin, supra note 152, at 161.
158. See Fellas, supra note 155, at 132.
159. See id.
160. See Arbitration Act 1996 (Eng.); JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 16-17; Fellas, supra note
155, at 132.
161. Fellas, supra note 155, at 132-33 (quoting article VI.N(1) of Bermuda Form XL XS-004); see
also C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 [2] (Eng.) (quoting portions of the conditions section of a Bermuda Form policy dealing with arbitration).
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(1)
may prohibit payment in respect of punitive damages
hereunder;
(2)
pertain to regulation under the New York Insurance Law,
or regulations issued by the Insurance Department of the State of
New York pursuant thereto, applying to insurers doing insurance
business, or issuance, delivery or procurement of policies of insurance, within the State of New York or as respects risks or insureds
situated in the State of New York; or
(3)

are inconsistent with any provisions of this Policy;

provided, however, that the provisions, stipulations, exclusions and conditions of this Policy are to be construed in an evenhanded fashion as between the Insured and the Insurer; without limitation, where the language
of this Policy is deemed to be ambiguous or otherwise unclear, the issue
shall be resolved in the manner most consistent with the relevant provisions, stipulations, exclusions and conditions (without regard to authorship of the language, without any presumption or arbitrary interpretation
or construction in favor of either the Insured or the Insurer or reference to
the “reasonable expectations” of either thereof or to contra proforentem
and without reference to parole or other extrinsic evidence). To the extent
that New York law is inapplicable by virtue of any exception or proviso
enumerated above or otherwise, and as respects arbitration procedure
pursuant to Condition N, the internal laws of England and Wales shall
apply.162
Arbitration and choice of law provisions in other Bermuda Forms feature
slightly different language but establish the same basic structure.163 Notably, this
split between procedural and substantive competence has been adopted in other
types of international insurance and reinsurance matters.164
The developers of the Bermuda Form adopted this type of dual competency
for very specific reasons. First, adoption of an even-handed approach to resolution of the substantive dispute was vital to widespread acceptance of the Bermuda
Form, and New York law was thought to be relatively neutral as between insurers
and policyholders.165 Second, developers of the Bermuda Form wanted to protect
the procedural process from judicial interference as much as possible, and London
was known as one of the best jurisdictions for arbitration, even in the 1980s.166
162. Fellas, supra note 155, at 134-35 (quoting article VI.O of Bermuda Form XL XS-004); see also
C, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 at [2] (quoting portions of the conditions section of a Bermuda Form
policy dealing with governing law).
163. Fellas, supra note 155, at 133. Notably, Form XL XS-004 and similar forms incorporate the
Arbitration Act 1996 through language referring to “any statutory modifications or amendments thereto.” Id. See Arbitration Act 1996 (Eng.); JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 30, 272. Some policies
indicate that Bermuda is another possible situs for the arbitration. See Dolin & Posner, supra note 38,
at 79.
164. See Masters, supra note 17, at *14.
165. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 16-17.
166. See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration-Friendliness: Promises of Principle and Realities of Practice, 23
ARB. INT’L 477, 477-78 (2007). Although English courts were not as supportive of international arbi-
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Another more pragmatic consideration involved the fact that a significant number
of entities involved in the excess insurance market (including, most notably,
Lloyd’s) were based in London and would benefit from a rule requiring local proceedings.167
Although this sort of split competency may have been somewhat unusual at
the time the Bermuda Form was initially developed, the practice of separating
procedural and substantive law has become quite common in international arbitration.168 Indeed, the principle of party autonomy has developed to the point where
parties to international arbitration are free not only to have their substantive disputes governed by a national law different than that of the country where the arbitration is seated, but also to have their substantive disputes governed by general
principles of commercial or international law rather than the law of a particular
country.169
Although the Bermuda Form’s dispute resolution mechanism is not problematic from a jurisprudential perspective,170 certain practical issues can arise as a
result of the split of jurisdictional competency.171 For example, Bermuda Form
arbitrations give rise to a number of conflict of laws concerns, including those
relating to:


the law governing the interpretation of the arbitration agreement
(generally accepted to be English law pursuant to the leading decision of C v. D);172

tration in the 1980s as they are now, the development of arbitration law in England at that time was
nevertheless far ahead of that of United States. See BORN, supra note 10, at 35-39, 41-50. For example,
in the 1980s U.S. courts were still considering whether “manifest disregard” of the law could operate
as a means of overturning awards rendered or enforced in the United States. See id. at 159.
167. See Dolin & Posner, supra note 38, at 70 n.5 (noting that ACE, one of the entities responsible
for developing the Bermuda Form, includes a British subsidiary (ACE UK) that was at one time “the
largest managing agency at Lloyd’s”); see also ACE Global Markets, ACE GROUP,
http://www.acegroup.com/uk-en/about-ace-in-the-uk/ace-global-markets.aspx (last visited Nov. 2,
2015) (noting ACE is currently the managing agency of Syndicate 2488 at Lloyd’s); About Lloyds,
LLOYDS, https://www.lloyds.com/lloyds (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (describing function of Lloyd’s).
168. Such mechanisms are more problematic in litigation. See Marta Pertegás & Brooke Adele Marshall, Party Autonomy and Its Limits: Convergence Through the New Hague Principles on Choice of
Law in International Commercial Contracts, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 975, 995-1002 (2014). Parties in
international arbitration may also have a bit more flexibility with respect to the application of mandatory principles of law, although such laws may not be evaded altogether. See id.
169. See id.
170. See BORN, supra note 10, at 473.
171. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 29-43.
172. See C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 [16] (Eng.). The question of which law governs the interpretation of the arbitration agreement is different than the question of which law governs the merits of
the dispute or which law controls arbitral procedure. See BORN, supra note 10, at 473-74. When seeking to identify the law that governed the interpretation of the arbitration provision in C v. D (a Bermuda Form case), the English Court of Appeal
concluded that whilst it was possible to find examples of a situation where the law governing the
arbitration agreement was different from the law of the place where the reference was conducted,
it would be a rare case in which those two systems of law were not the same. This was because
an agreement to arbitrate will normally have a closer and more real connection with the place
chosen as the seat of the arbitration than the place of the law governing the underlying contract.
However, agreeing with the approach of Cooke J. [below], the Court of Appeal emphasised that
these general factors were less important than the indications to be found in the terms of the arbitration agreement itself. The provisions of the arbitration clause identified by Cooke J. as indicat-
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the law governing the internal processes of the arbitration (determined to be English law pursuant to the explicit language of the
Bermuda Form, although arbitrators wield a great deal of discretion
in matters of procedure);173



the law governing choice of law concerns (generally deemed to be
English law);174



the law governing the substantive dispute (determined to be modified New York law pursuant to the explicit language of the Bermuda
Form, but with some concerns, such as the extent to which the Bermuda Form purports to exclude various regulatory laws and public
policies regarding the interpretation of the Bermuda Form);175



the law governing the underlying insurance claim (which can involve jurisdictions other than England or New York);176 and



the division between procedural law and substantive law, particularly with respect to issues relating to the burden of proof, contract interpretation, various types of estoppel, statutes of limitation, remedies, costs and attorneys’ fees, and legal privilege.177

These types of questions are routine in other types of international commercial arbitration and therefore raise few questions within the international arbitral
community.178 However, parties and practitioners who specialize in domestic
insurance do not routinely face these types of issues. This lack of familiarity with
standard international procedural and conflict of laws concerns can lead to unwarranted criticism of international insurance and reinsurance arbitration on both a
practical and jurisprudential level.179

ing a desire by the parties for the finality of any award would be rendered meaningless if either
party could instigate review proceedings in the court of New York, and this was a strong pointer
towards English law being the applicable law. For these reasons, D’s contention that the law of
New York governed the agreement to arbitrate was again rejected.
David Foster, C v D: The English Court of Appeal Upholds an Anti-Suit Injunction in Support of Arbitral Proceedings, 11 INT’L ARB. L. REV. 104, 108 (2008); see also C, [2007] EWCA Civ. at 1282.
Notably, the fact that both parties in C v. D were U.S. corporations did not affect the English Court of
Appeal’s determination. See id.; Hew R. Dundas, C v D: The USA Conquers England – Or Does It?
The Law of the Arbitration Agreement, Challenges to Awards, and Abuse of Process, 73 ARB. 431, 439
(2007).
173. See BORN, supra note 10, at 2123; Robert W. DiUbaldo, Evolving Issues in Reinsurance Disputes: The Power of Arbitrators, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 83, 84 (2008) (discussing arbitral discretion
in the area of reinsurance arbitration).
174. English choice of law rules may differ than those applicable in the United States. See JACOBS ET
AL., supra note 154, at 32-33; Masters, supra note 17, at *3-4.
175. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 33-36.
176. See id. at 36-37.
177. See id. at 43-50, 308-33.
178. See BORN, supra note 10, at 472-635.
179. See DiUbaldo, supra note 173, at 84; Masters, supra note 17, at *4, 15. Arbitration under the
Bermuda Form also departs from established insurance law in some substantive regards, although that
issue is beyond the scope of the current discussion. See Fellas, supra note 155, at 134-35 (noting that
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A lack of understanding of the standard norms of international arbitration can
also lead to expensive and unnecessary litigation. For example, a dispute arose
recently as to which court has proper jurisdiction over matters ancillary to a Bermuda Form arbitration – the court in London, which was where the arbitration was
seated, or the court in New York, which was the place of the law governing the
substantive dispute.180 The question was addressed by the English Court of Appeal in the context of an application for an anti-suit injunction seeking to halt the
judicial proceedings in New York.181 In its decision, the English Court of Appeal
indicated that English courts retain curial jurisdiction over all Bermuda Form
arbitrations, stating
that the central point at issue was whether or not, by choosing London as
the seat of the arbitration and consequently English law as the law applicable to the conduct of the arbitration, the parties must be taken to have
agreed that proceedings to challenge or review the award should be
those, and only those, permitted by English law. The Court of Appeal
held that the parties must be taken to have agreed this, largely adopting
the reasoning of Cooke J. [below].
The whole purpose behind the Bermuda Form, according to the
Court, with its dispute resolution procedure providing for English arbitration applying New York’s substantive law to issues arising under the policy, was that judicial remedies in respect of the award should be those allowed by the Arbitration Act 1996, and nothing more. If New York judicial remedies were to be imported into this scheme, that would . . . be a
recipe for confusion which could not have been intended by the parties.
The agreement on the seat of an arbitration was analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, and any claim for a remedy going to the existence or scope of the arbitrator’s jurisdiction, or the validity of an interim
or final award, should only be made in the courts of the place specified as
a seat of the arbitration. C was accordingly entitled to the permanent antisuit injunction restraining D from initiating proceedings in the US
courts.182
This determination is consistent with the standard understanding of jurisdictional competence in international commercial arbitration, which gives courts at
questions of privilege may be applied differently in Bermuda Form arbitration, since insurers do not
have a duty to defend the policyholder under the Bermuda Form).
180. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 29.
181. The suit in New York involved a challenge to a partial award for manifest disregard of New
York law. See C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 (Eng.); see also C v. D, [2007] EWHC 1541 [12] –
[13] (Comm) (Eng.). The application to the New York court faced a number of difficulties, including
(1) the fact that it was a partial, as opposed to a final, award; (2) the fact that it alleged the arbitration
was outside the scope of the New York Convention; and (3) the fact that it sought to invoke the concept of “manifest disregard of law,” which has been determined to be largely, if not entirely, inapplicable in matters involving international arbitration. See id.; see also STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at
62-63 (regarding problems enforcing partial awards); id. at 28-29 (regarding the scope of the New
York Convention, including in matters arising entirely between U.S. parties); id. at 85 (regarding
“manifest disregard” in cases involving foreign arbitral awards).
182. Foster, supra note 172, at 106; see also C, [2007] EWCA Civ. at 1282.
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the seat of arbitration the exclusive power to hear certain matters that arise before,
during and after the arbitral proceedings.183 However, parties to international
disputes are becoming increasingly litigious, and C v. D may herald a more contentious era in Bermuda Form arbitration.184
The outcome in C v. D does not suggest that the courts of New York or any
other U.S. jurisdiction cannot ever be implicated in Bermuda Form disputes.185
According to well-established principles of international arbitration law, a party
who prevails in a Bermuda Form arbitration in London may bring an action in the
United States to recognize or enforce the arbitral award.186 U.S. courts may
properly accept jurisdiction over this type of matter, a feature that is important in
addressing certain doubts about the propriety of Bermuda Form disputes, since
this procedure allows a non-prevailing party to resist enforcement proceedings.187
Although the party objecting to a Bermuda Form award in a New York court may
only do so on a limited number of grounds established as a matter of international
law, the states parties to the New York Convention have agreed that this approach
is both fair and appropriate.188
One of the most common criticisms of Bermuda Form arbitration involves the
apparent lack of judicial scrutiny of the merits of the award due to the absence of
an appellate mechanism.189 Although the English Arbitration Act 1996 does allow
for substantive appeals in certain circumstances, that provision only applies to
points of English law, which means that it is inapplicable in Bermuda Form cases,
which are governed by foreign (i.e., New York) law.190 Appeals to English courts
are also prohibited as a matter of contract under policies that explicitly waive the
right to an appeal under the Arbitration Act 1996.191
183. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 33-36 (discussing principle of primary jurisdiction and
secondary jurisdiction); see also C, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 at [17] (analogizing the choice of the
arbitral seat as akin to an exclusive jurisdiction provision). The court at the seat also has the exclusive
power to annul or set aside the award. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 34. However, any court
in the world has the ability to recognize or enforce an arbitral award once it has been rendered, even if
the award has been annulled or set aside by a court at the seat. See id.; see also New York Convention,
supra note 43, art. V(1)(e).
184. See Masters, supra note 17, at *14 (noting that whereas parties to a Bermuda Form dispute used
to simply settle their cases, they are now going through with arbitration); S.I. Strong, Increasing Legalism in International Commercial Arbitration: A New Theory of Causes, A New Approach to Cures, 7
WORLD ARB. & MED. REV. 117, 117 (2013) (noting an increase in litigiousness of international commercial arbitration as a general matter).
185. See C, [2007] EWCA Civ. at 1282.
186. Enforcement proceedings in a foreign state are seldom required, since the vast majority of parties comply voluntarily with international awards. See BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 10, ¶ 11.02.
However, a party may bring enforcement proceedings in any state it wishes. See STRONG, GUIDE,
supra note 10, at 33.
187. Other jurisdictional requirements must still be met. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 35-36.
188. See New York Convention, supra note 43, arb. V; see also infra notes 218-38 and accompanying text. Non-prevailing parties cannot bring an affirmative action to annul an arbitral award in any
country other than the arbitral seat. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 34.
189. Some commentators claim this approach “disadvantages policyholders who do not engage in
these kinds of arbitrations regularly.” Masters, supra note 17, at *16. Similar concerns are occasionally
raised in other types of international commercial arbitration. See Irene M. Ten Cate, International
Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1109, 1111 (2012).
190. See Arbitration Act 1996 § 69 (Eng.); see also JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 15 (noting also
that this provision is similar to that developed as a matter of case law under section 1 of the Arbitration
Act 1975).
191. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 15 n.44.
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These provisions have effectively precluded the appeal of any Bermuda Form
arbitration, which means that there are essentially no judicial decisions relating to
the substantive provisions of a standard Bermuda Form policy. Indeed, the only
two Bermuda Form cases to have ever reached the English courts are C v. D,
which addressed choice of law and jurisdictional issues,192 and AstraZeneca Insurance Co. v. XL Insurance Co., which involved a somewhat unusual policy that
was governed by English rather than New York law and that allowed judicial
determination of any disputes that arose between the parties.193
The lack of judicial scrutiny of Bermuda Form arbitration has met with a
mixed reception. For example, some commentators have praised the Bermuda
Form process for fostering finality and avoiding the awkwardness of asking an
English court to take responsibility for determining and applying New York
law.194 However, other observers have criticized Bermuda Form arbitration as
hindering the development of the law195 and insulating important matters of public
policy from public view.196
In many ways, these criticisms appear off-point.197 For example, concerns
about the development of the law appear to suggest that the absence of judicial
consideration of Bermuda Form arbitration precludes the possibility of “uniformity and predictability in interpretation of policies and contracts.”198 In fact, the
history of Bermuda Form arbitration suggests that this type of consistency does in
fact exist, largely as a result of the small, close-knit nature of the insurance arbitration world.199 Furthermore, while arbitral awards do not constitute formal precedent, they are often highly persuasive to other tribunals, particularly on matters
of procedural law, and are published far more frequently than non-specialists realize.200 Finally, the continuing use of Bermuda Form arbitration suggests that arbi-

192. See C v. D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 (Eng.).
193. See AstraZeneca Ins. Co., Ltd. v. XL Ins. Co., Ltd., [2013] EWCA Civ. 1660 [8] (Eng.). As a
result, AstraZeneca cannot be considered an arbitration case. See id.; see also Masters, supra note 17,
at *15-16 (discussing the trial court opinion rather than the Court of Appeal decision).
194. See also Dundas, supra note 172, at 439 (discussing English treatment of Bermuda Form disputes).
195. See Randall, supra note 9, at 262-63; Larry P. Schiffer, How Court Decisions Can Help Improve
Arbitration Clauses in Reinsurance Contracts, 40 BRIEF 54, 54-61 (2011) (addressing a number of
issues that are also relevant to Bermuda Form arbitration).
196. See Jeffery B. Struckhofff, The Irony of Uberrimae Fidei: Bad Faith Practices in Marine Insurance, 29 TUL. MAR. L.J. 287, 311-12 (2005). That, of course, was the precise intent of the drafters of
the Bermuda Form, who viewed U.S. judges and juries as largely suspect in disputes involving tort
insurance. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 14. Furthermore, commentators who argue that “U.S.
courts should refuse to enforce choice of law, forum selection, and London arbitration clauses when
they are used to contravene public policy or deprive an insured of a remedy” fail to take into account
decades of U.S. Supreme Court precedent providing for party autonomy in the area of international
dispute resolution. Struckhofff, supra, at 311-12; see also infra note 222 and accompanying text.
197. These criticisms are also highly reminiscent of the types of objections that were set aside long
ago in other forms of international arbitration. See BORN, supra note 10, at 35, 38, 41-42.
198. McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *11.
199. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at vii (noting practitioners and arbitrators are drawn from a
small cadre of insiders); Merkin, supra note 152, at 162; see also Masters, supra note 17, at *14 (noting that parties to a Bermuda Form dispute have traditionally settled their cases, which suggests a
standard understanding of the relative merits of particular issues).
200. See STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 21-23; Fellas, supra note 155, at 134; see also supra
notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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trators are doing a better job at promoting predictability than judges and juries
once did.201
Concerns about public policy also fall short, since such comments fail to appreciate the extent to which U.S. courts are capable of addressing matters that are
truly relevant to U.S. public policy. According to the “second look doctrine”
enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., courts are entitled to take a “second look” at certain public law
claims at the end of the proceedings, when the award is being enforced.202 This
principle is based on Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, which indicates that judges can consider matters of public policy in any action to enforce or
recognize a foreign arbitral award.203 Although Mitsubishi arose in the context of
antitrust claims, some people view insurance and reinsurance law as reflecting a
number of important public law issues, even in the international realm, and U.S.
courts could very well decide that the second look doctrine applies to Bermuda
Form and other types of international insurance arbitrations to the same extent it
does to international arbitration of antitrust disputes.204
Although courts are expressly allowed to consider public policy when considering the enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, specialists in insurance law
would do well to recognize that such arguments seldom prevail in the international
realm due to the extremely narrow interpretation of “public policy” in international commercial arbitration.205 For example, courts agree that
[e]ven though the Convention refers clearly to the public policy of the
enforcing state, it has been a consistent theme of recognition decisions
under Article V(2)(b) to interpret national public policies in a manner
that is consistent, insofar as possible, with the objectives of the Convention and the public policies and interests of other Contracting States.
This approach has manifested itself in two principal ways: (a) the application of “international” public policies, rather than domestic public policies, under Article V(2)(b), and (b) the exercise of a substantial degree of

201. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at vii-viii.
202. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985) (“Having permitted the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the
antitrust laws has been addressed . . . . While the efficacy of the arbitral process requires that substantive review at the award-enforcement stage remain minimal, it would not require intrusive inquiry to
ascertain that the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actually decided them.”); see also
BORN, supra note 10, at 3689.
203. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. V(2)(b) (“Recognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition and
enforcement is sought finds that: . . . (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country.”). Matters arising under Article V(2) of the New York Convention can be raised on the application of a party or sua sponte. See id.; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10,
at 73 (noting that outcome arises because of the absence of language relating to proof being submitted
by a party and because of the public nature of the issues at stake).
204. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 638. One interesting counterargument might be based on the
allegation that the McCarran-Ferguson Act constitutes a legislative grant of antitrust immunity. See 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2012); Susan Beth Farmer, Competition and Regulation in the Insurance Sector:
Reassessing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 89 OR. L. REV. 915, 948 (2011).
205. See BORN, supra note 10, at 3689 (noting courts operating under the second look doctrine are
highly deferential to arbitral tribunals); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 84.
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restraint and moderation in the application of public policies under Article V(2)(b).206
Thus, U.S. courts have limited application of Article V(2)(b) to “only those
circumstances where enforcement would violate our most basic notions of morality and justice.”207 Furthermore, Article V(2)(b) does not permit non-enforcement
based on “erroneous legal reasoning or misapplication of law,” two theories that
are reminiscent of the highly controversial principle of “manifest disregard of
law,” which, if allowed, would effectively permit substantive review of the
award.208
At this point, there has been no major U.S. decision relating to the enforcement of an arbitral award involving the Bermuda Form.209 However, it is possible
to contemplate certain public policy arguments arising in the future. For example,
a party might object to enforcement of a Bermuda Form award based on language
indicating that arbitrators are prohibited from considering principles that
pertain to regulation under the New York Insurance Law, or regulations
issued by the Insurance Department of the State of New York pursuant
thereto, applying to insurers doing insurance business, or issuance, delivery or procurement of policies of insurance, within the State of New
York or as respects risks or insureds situated in the State of New York.210
Although this sort of challenge is in many ways predictable, it will face a
number of difficulties. First, the public policy of New York cannot necessarily be
considered the public policy of the United States, particularly given the statecentric nature of the policies in question (which explicitly refer only to matters
internal to New York).211 Furthermore, New York public policy likely cannot be
considered to rise to the level of an international public policy.
Second, although some Bermuda Form arbitrations may appear to be exclusively between U.S. parties, many of those matters will nevertheless have significant foreign connections.212 This type of international nexus can be problematic

206. See Karaha Bodas Co., L.L.C. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364
F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 84.
207. Telenor Mobile Commc’ns AS v. Storm LLC, 584 F.3d 396, 411 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
208. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 306; see also supra note 181 and accompanying text (regarding
C v. D and arguments based on manifest disregard of law).
209. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 15. This phenomenon may largely be the result of the fact
that, until recently, most Bermuda Form arbitrations settled. See Masters, supra note 17, at *14.
210. Fellas, supra note 155, at 134-35 (quoting article VI.O of Bermuda Form XL XS-004); see C v.
D, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 [2] (Eng.) (quoting portions of the conditions section of a Bermuda Form
policy dealing with governing law). The exclusion of punitive damages in international commercial
arbitration is not problematic as a matter of public policy. See BORN, supra note 10, at 355; see also
supra note 162 and accompanying text (noting punitive damages are excluded from Bermuda Form
arbitration).
211. See supra notes 55, 143 and accompanying text.
212. See C, [2007] EWCA Civ. 1282 at [2] (noting that although the named parties were from the
United States, “[t]he claimant was the named insured but the definition of the insured included any
subsidiary, affiliate or associated company of the claimant as listed in the Schedule to the Policy. That
list included 303 companies incorporated outside the United States of America so the policy offered
world-wide cover.”).
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from a public policy perspective, since U.S. courts are extremely hesitant to give
extraterritorial effect to U.S. laws.213
Third, some criticism of Bermuda Form arbitration appears to focus on the
need to protect the proper development of New York law.214 However, there is no
need to correlate the modified form of New York law used in Bermuda Form arbitration with the law applied in New York state courts, since arbitral awards have
no formal precedential power and thus cannot be used to inform the development
of case law in New York or the United States more generally.215 Furthermore,
neither U.S. nor New York courts can be in any way “offended” by the way in
which arbitrators or foreign courts interpret the Bermuda Form’s modified form of
New York law, just as various international bodies such as the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) cannot be offended if an
arbitrator or court misapplies general principles of international law such as the
UNIDROIT Principles on International Commercial Contracts.216
Many of these concerns appear to arise as a result of a misunderstanding
about the way in which party autonomy and public policy interact in international
arbitration.217 As the following section shows, numerous courts, including those
in the United States, have protected procedural and substantive freedom in arbitration even in matters that can be seen as affecting public values.

213. See Strong, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 33, at 915, 917 n.94.
214. See Randall, supra note 9, at 262-63; Schiffer, supra note 195, at 54-61.
215. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Critics who enunciate concerns about the way in
which arbitration precludes the “proper development” of the law tend to ignore the fact that arbitral
decisions do not affect judicial standards of interpretation. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
However, arbitrators can and often do take other arbitral awards into account in their determinations,
which suggests the potential for development of various principles within the arbitral realm, thereby
ensuring consistency and predictability as a matter of substance and procedure. See supra notes 66,
199 and accompanying text. Internal consistency is particularly likely to arise in fields where practitioners and arbitrators share a common legal background, as is the case with international insurance
and reinsurance law. See supra notes 199 and accompanying text.
216. See
Principles
of
Commercial
Contracts,
UNIDROIT,
http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-2010; see also Charles
N. Brower & Jeremy K. Sharpe, The Creeping Codification of Transnational Commercial Law: An
Arbitrator’s Perspective, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 199, 205 (2004) (discussing choice of law in arbitration).
217. The Bermuda Form arbitration has also been subject to several other types of criticism, although
those concerns are equally misplaced. For example, some people criticize Bermuda Form arbitration
for not being significantly less expensive than litigation. See Masters, supra note 17, at *4, *15. However, this criticism not only misses the major rationales supporting arbitration in the international
arena, it also fails to appreciate how international disputes differ from domestic disputes. See supra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text. Commentators adopting this perspective also object to the possibility of “a series of arbitrations . . . to go up the ‘chain’ of insurance companies, with the attendant
risk of inconsistent results and increased costs.” Masters, supra note 17, at *15. However, this type of
“batching” (also known as “occurrence integration”) is expressly required in Bermuda Form arbitration. See JACOBS ET AL., supra note 154, at 18-19; Masters, supra note 17, at *17. Such problems can
also be avoided by consolidating proceedings or engaging in various types of large-scale arbitration.
See S.I. STRONG, MASS, CLASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 18, 22, 123-24, 240, 349 (2012) (discussing large-scale arbitration in the insurance context);
Mitchell S. King & John E. Matosky, Considering Consolidation, 78 DEF. COUNS. J. 70, 71 (2011)
(discussing consolidation of insurance and reinsurance arbitration under U.S. law).
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INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE AND REINSURANCE ARBITRATION –
TENSIONS BETWEEN PARTY AUTONOMY AND PUBLIC POLICY

Although international insurance and reinsurance are not subject to the same
level of formal regulation as domestic insurance, critics of international insurance
and reinsurance arbitration nevertheless invoke various types of public policy
concerns as grounds for challenging the use of arbitration in international insurance disputes.218 For example, commentators have suggested that arbitration is
used as a means for unscrupulous parties to evade their legal obligations.219 These
types of concerns are not unique to the insurance industry and have often been
raised (and overcome) in other types of international arbitration.220
Although public policy issues can be raised in international arbitration, the
calculus is somewhat different than in the domestic context, as discussed previously.221 Furthermore, the fact that Congress has allowed states to limit arbitration of domestic insurance disputes under the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not
necessarily mean that the same result will or should occur in international disputes, since the U.S. Supreme Court and numerous lower courts have all “articulate[d] a uniform policy in favor of enforcing agreements to arbitrate internationally, even when ‘a contrary result would be forthcoming in a domestic context.’”222
Some experts maintain that this pro-arbitration policy is based on the fact that
international commercial arbitration provides “a neutral, speedy and expert dispute resolution process, largely subject to the parties’ control, in a single, centralized forum, with internationally-enforceable dispute resolution agreements and
decisions.”223 However, that rationale focuses on why parties and practitioners
might want to engage in international arbitration and does not explain why courts
and legislatures are willing to allow parties to exercise an extremely high degree
of substantive and procedural autonomy in cross-border business disputes in matters that may affect the public interest.224
The most popular explanation for why states support of international commercial arbitration is economic in nature.225 Conventional wisdom suggests that
allowing parties to an international transaction to choose the substantive and pro218. See McLauchlan, supra note 12, at *3; see also Masters, supra note 17, at *3 (discussing regulatory regime).
219. See Randall, supra note 9, at 257-64; Struckhofff, supra note 196, at 311-12
220. See Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Mandatory Rules and International Arbitration, 23 AM. REV.
INT’L ARB. 49, 50-51, 73 (2012) (discussing concerns in international commercial arbitration more
generally).
221. See supra notes 143, 205 and accompanying text.
222. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (emphasis
added); see also 15 U.S.C. §1012(b) (2012); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. plc, 685 F.3d 376, 390
(4th Cir. 2012); STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 37.
223. BORN, supra note 10, at 73.
224. Some analysis has been conducted in this regard. See S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C.
§1782: Distinguishing International Commercial Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration,
1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 347-50 (2013) [hereinafter Strong, Discovery] (discussion public
grants of jurisdiction); id. at 360-67 (discussing state interest in international commercial arbitration).
225. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration,
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1343, 1345 (2009). Closer examination might reveal some additional justifications, although that analysis is beyond the scope of the current discussion. See Strong, Discovery,
supra note 224, at 347-50, 360-67.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

31

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 4

314

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2015

cedural law applicable to their dispute promotes international trade and commerce
in a way that would not be possible if national courts retained exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.226 Although this hypothesis has not been empirically
proven, it has also not been effectively challenged,227 and the numerous benefits
associated with robust international trade has led the vast majority of developed
and developing countries to grant parties a significant amount of autonomy relating to the resolution of cross-border commercial disputes, even at the cost of certain domestic interests, so as to maximize national economic growth.228
These sorts of commercial rationales may be particularly persuasive in international insurance and reinsurance arbitration. Not only does the international
insurance industry constitute a significant and expanding part of the U.S. and
global economy, but international markets are far better at allocating and absorbing the risk of catastrophic risk than domestic markets would be.229 Furthermore,
the economic benefits associated with international insurance arbitration extend
not only to governments but also to individual policyholders, since the process of
spreading the risk internationally helps protect the viability of the insurer and
increases the likelihood of a full pay-out to an individual policyholder in cases of
catastrophic loss.230
Allowing a high degree of procedural and substantive autonomy in international insurance and reinsurance arbitration also makes sense given that the vast
majority of participants are sophisticated commercial entities negotiating at arm’s
length.231 Furthermore, the sums at issue in international insurance disputes tend

226. See BORN, supra note 10, at 77; see also Strong, Discovery, supra note 224, at 347-50, 360-67
(discussing jurisdictional issues in international arbitration).
227. No known study has ever considered whether the autonomy granted in international commercial
arbitration results in a net gain or a net cost to countries participating in the international arbitral regime. See S.I. Strong, International Litigation – Arbitration, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS (Jürgen George Backhaus ed., 2014) (outlining major law and economics analyses concerning international commercial arbitration). However, there are a number of law and economics
analyses relating to the choice of arbitration in the domestic realm. See id.; see also Christopher R.
Drahozal & Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Unbundling Procedure: Carve-Outs From Arbitration Clauses, 66
FLA. L. REV. 1945, 1948 n.15 (2014) (discussing procedural choice from a law and economics perspective). Furthermore, the large number of signatories to the New York Convention (currently 156) and
the depth of national legislation on international commercial arbitration demonstrates the extent to
which countries support international arbitration as a means of promoting trade. See New York Convention, supra note 43; New York Convention Status, supra note 45; Carbonneau, supra note 225, at
1345-46.
228. See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ¶¶
2-20, 26-19 to 26-22 (2003); BLACKABY ET AL., supra note 10, at ¶¶ 1.220 to 1.224; Loukas Mistelis,
Reality Test: Current State of Affairs in Theory and Practice Relating to “Lex Arbitri,” 17 AM. REV.
INT’L L. 155, 178 (2006) (suggesting commercial interests overcome state interests in “subjecting
arbitration proceedings to national law”).
229. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 144, at 3 (suggesting that 62% of U.S.
insurance premiums were ceded to offshore companies, although that number rises to 92% if the fact
that many U.S. reinsurers are owned by foreign companies is taken into account).
230. See Randall, supra note 9, at 259-60.
231. See supra notes 29, 39 and accompanying text. While some questions have been raised about the
propriety of allowing international insurance and reinsurance claims to be heard in a process that is
controlled by the parties, particularly those who operate as “repeat players,” parties who believe themselves relatively inexperienced in either a negotiation or dispute resolution process can always consult
with expert advisors, including counsel. See Masters, supra note 17, at *16 (claiming Bermuda Form
arbitration injures policyholders); see also Struckhofff, supra note 196, at 311-12 (discussing alleged
problems of arbitration).
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to be significant, running into the millions or billions of dollars.232 As a result,
international insurance arbitration can be easily distinguished from domestic
forms of insurance arbitration, where protectionist policies aimed at protecting
particularly vulnerable parties in relatively small disputes often justify the limitation of party autonomy.233
Given these features, it is not surprising that courts and legislatures around
the world have supported party autonomy in international insurance and reinsurance arbitration. As a result, parties are generally free to decide a variety of matters for themselves, including “the disputes to be arbitrated, the parties to the arbitration, the mode of constituting the arbitral tribunal, the selection of the arbitral
seat, the language of the arbitration, the arbitral procedures and the choice of the
applicable law(s).”234
This is not to say that party autonomy will prevail over the public interest in
all regards. To the contrary, established principles of international arbitration
identify when and how party autonomy may be limited to protect the parties, the
process or the public interest. These mechanisms typically come into play at the
end of the procedure, when parties attempt to enforce an arbitral award.235 Thus,
the second look doctrine protects against attempts to evade the various public
policies embedded in various substantive laws236 while other aspects of the New
York Convention preclude efforts to circumvent basic principles of procedural
fairness.237 These devices have proven extremely effective and have led to arbitration’s becoming the preferred means of resolving disputes in a wide variety of
cross-border business matters.238

VI.

CONCLUSION

Experts agree that “[t]he topic of international insurance is more important
than ever due to the increasing internationalization of business, the cross-border
nature of employment, and drastic changes in the types of risks companies face
and the types of insurance that mitigate those risks.”239 However, insurance law
232. The underlying figures can be astronomical. For example, international “[s]porting events like
the 2014 World Cup in Brazil generate around $2 billion in cancellation insurance.” Carolyn Cohn,
World Cup Insurers Face Many Claims, Disputes Over Russia, Qatar, INS. J. (June 19, 2015), available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2015/06/19/372424.htm. Similarly, large
amounts can arise in other types of insurance disputes. See Acosta v. Master Maint. & Constr. Inc.,
452 F.3d 373 (5th Cir. 2006) (involving a claim involving over 2,000 victims of a mustard gas release
and determining that the action fell within the scope of the New York Convention).
233. See Randall, supra note 9, at 259-60 (discussing small individual claims in the domestic context).
234. BORN, supra note 10, at 1257 (footnotes omitted). These and other issues are typically decided at
the time the arbitration agreement is drafted. See Labes, supra note 14, at 896-902 (containing various
suggestions on drafting arbitration agreements relating to insurance disputes).
235. This approach is considered an appropriate balance between the need for a speedy resolution of
the dispute and the need to avoid procedural improprieties. See BORN, supra note 10, at 3645, 3689.
236. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985); see
also supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
237. See New York Convention, supra note 43, art. V; STRONG, GUIDE, supra note 10, at 71-85.
238. See BORN, supra note 10, at 91-92.
239. Mark R. Goodman, Navigating Ambiguity: Approaches to Dealing with US Regulation of International Insurance, in INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE LAW CLIENT STRATEGIES: LEADING LAWYERS ON
DEVELOPING PURCHASE STRATEGIES AND OVERCOMING REGULATORY CHALLENGES (2015), available at 2015 WL 831984, *1, *4.
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does not exist in a vacuum. As Professor Jerry noted, there are an increasing
number of convergences between the substantive law of insurance and the procedural law of arbitration.240 These convergences give rise to a number of actual
and potential concerns that must be addressed by commentators so as to improve
the resolution of insurance disputes on an individual and systemic level.
Although more research is necessary in all types of insurance dispute resolution, this Response has attempted to demonstrate the particular complexity of
international insurance and reinsurance arbitration. As this discussion has shown,
the current regime gives rise to a wide variety of tensions, including those between national and international law, foreign and domestic law, and public and
private interests. While these tensions can be reconciled in a principled manner,
that process requires a sophisticated knowledge of insurance law, international
law and arbitration law. As a result, experts in insurance and international arbitration must work together to ensure that dispute resolution processes in this field
operate in a fair and efficient manner. The hope is that specialists in both fields
will heed Professor Jerry’s call to action so as to identify new ideas and new insights into this important area of law.

240. See Jerry, supra note 1, at 260.
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